DETERMINING WHERE THE CLAIM AROSE
UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) IN MULTI-STATE
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS
Roy H. Wepner*
Judge William C. Conner's thoughtful 1974 opinion in Honda
Associates, Inc. v. Nozawa Trading, Inc.' established a provident
starting point for determining venue in multi-state trademark infringement actions. During the following five years, however, other
courts twisted its analysis beyond recognition. While Honda held that
a trademark infringement claim did not arise in a district, for purposes of venue, solely because thirty-seven dollars worth of infringing
sales occurred within that district, 2 subsequent decisions found that
venue could be sustained in numerous districts in which a nominal
amount of infringing sales took place, one of which was invariably the
district where the plaintiff resided. 3 With the 1979 United States
4
Supreme Court decision in Leroy v. Great Western United Corp.,
this line of cases ceased being merely contradictory and confusing and
became bad law. Construing the pertinent venue statute 5 in a nontrademark context, the Court in Leroy held that the statute was not
intended to provide venue at the plaintiffs residence or to give plaintiff a broad selection of different districts." On the contrary, the
Court observed that only in an unusual case would a claim be deemed
7
to arise in more than one district.
Instead of abating inconsistent interpretations of the federal
venue statute in trademark infringement cases, however, Leroy went
unnoticed. Decisions since then have blithely ignored controlling precedent. This article will consider the curious anomaly of federal venue
as it applies to trademark infringement actions and will suggest rules
on how the issue should be decided.

* B.S.M.E., M.M.E., Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; J.D., University of Pennsylvania.

Associate, Lerner, David, Littenberg & Samuel, Westfield, New Jersey.
374 F. Supp. 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
t See id. at 892.
3 See, e.g., McDonald's Corp. v. Congdon Die Casting, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Ill.
1978). See infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
4 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
s 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1976).
6 443 U.S. at 184.
7 Id. at 185.
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ACTIONS FOR TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT

A trademark is "any word, name, symbol, or device or any
combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others." 8 A service mark is "a mark used in the sale
or advertising of services to identify the services of one person and
distinguish them from services of others." 9 The Lanham Trademark
Act of 1946,10 and the regulations promulgated thereunder,' establish
a comprehensive procedure for the federal registration of trademarks
12
and service marks.
Unauthorized use in commerce of a reproduction, counterfeit,
copy, or colorable imitation of a registered trademark in connection
with the sale of goods or services subjects the user to a civil action for
infringement if the use is likely to confuse, cause mistake, or to deceive.13 With or without a federal trademark registration, one who
has adopted and used a trademark may also bring an action against an
infringer for common law trademark infringement and unfair competition.' 4 Additionally, under many circumstances, the same act of
trademark infringement also constitutes a violation of section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act.' 5 It has been said that in an action asserting all

8 15 U.S.C.

§ 1127 (1976).
9 Id. Service marks are registrable and entitled to protection in the same manner as
trademarks. Health Indus., Inc. v. European Health Spas, 489 F. Supp. 860, 866 (D.S.D. 1980);
see 15 U.S.C. § 1053 (1976). Additionally, trademark and service mark infringement cases are
governed by identical standards. WMS, Inc. v. Bailey, 297 F. Supp. 870, 872 n.1 (M.D. Tenn.
1969). No distinction is made hereinafter between trademarks and service marks.
10 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976).
n 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.21-.187 (1981).
'2 For a detailed discussion of the federal registration of marks, see I J. McCArrHY, TRADEMARK5 AND UNFAm CoMPTIrrTON § 19, at 653-752 (1973).
13 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l) (1976).
14 Unfair competition has been defined as the diversion of customers by one representing his
goods as those of another. Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 973 (2d Cir. 1928). A
finding of trademark infringement necessarily constitutes a finding of unfair competion.
Grotrian, Helfferich, Schultz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707, 721
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), modified on other grounds, 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975).
Is 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976). This statute provides:
(a) Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods
or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation or origin, or
any false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending
falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to
enter into commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such
designation of origin or description or representation cause or procure the same to be
transported or used in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to be transported
or used, shall be liable to a civil action by any person doing business in the locality
falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in which said locality is situated, or
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three claims "it appears to matter little under which legal theory
plaintiff proceeds."16
The federal courts are vested with subject matter jurisdiction
over actions arising under the trademark laws, both by the Lanham
Act itself 17 and the Judicial Code.' 8 However, unlike actions arising
under the patent and copyright laws, in which federal jurisdiction is
exclusive, state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over trademark
cases. 19 While there are special venue statutes for patent20 and copyright cases,2 ' there is no similar statute for trademark
cases. Thus,
22
they are governed by the general venue laws.

THE GENERAL VENUE STATUTE

Venue relates not to the court's adjudicatory power, but rather to
23
the proper place where the adjudicatory power is to be exercised.
The concept is "oriented around the convenience of the litigants and
the court system. '"24 Interpretation of federal venue statutes is a
matter of federal law, 25 and the burden of proving that venue is
proper is on the plaintiff. 6

by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any
such false description or representation.
Id. It has been interpreted as granting "relief against that kind of unfair competition which is
analogous to the misappropriation or misuse of trade names or trademarks." Geisel v. Poynter
Prods., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). A federal registration is not a prerequisite
for a section 43(a) claim. DCA Food Indus. v. Hawthorn Mellody, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 574

(S.D.N.Y. 1979).

16Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Extra Special Prods.,

Inc., 451 F. Supp. 555, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
17 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1976).
S 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (a) (1976).
,9Id. The section contains the jurisdictional rules for those actions. It states:

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under
any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and
trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent,
plant variety protection and copyright cases.
Id.
10

Id. § 1400(b).

21Id. § 1400(a).
2 Sugar Beet Prod. Co. v. Supply Co., 198 U.S.P.Q. 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
' See generally C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 42 at 149-59
(1970).
24 Jones v. United States, 407 F. Supp. 873, 876 (N.D. Tex. 1976); see Nierbo v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-68 (1939).
Is McDonald's Corp. v. Congdon Die Casting Co., 454 F. Supp. 145, 147 (N.D. Ill.
1978).
This is, of course, true with respect to interpreting the phrase "claim arose," the subject of this
article. Leroy, 443 U.S. at 183 n.15; Commercial Lighting Prods., Inc. v. United States District
Court, 537 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1976).
" National Distillers & Chem. Corp. v. Department of Energy, 487 F. Supp. 34, 37 n.9 (D.
Del. 1980); Besuner v. Faberge, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 278, 280 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Ryan v. Glenn,
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The first three subsections of section 1391 of Title 28 of the
United States Code, sometimes referred to as the "general venue

statute," read as follows:
(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity
of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be
brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.
(b) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on
diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district
where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose, except as
otherwise provided by law.
(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is
incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and
such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such
27
corporation for venue purposes.

Subsection (a) essentially concerns pure diversity cases. It affords
the widest possible choice of venues, in that suit may be brought not
only where all the defendants reside or where the claim arose, but also
in a district where all plaintiffs reside. Thus, for example, in a simple
two-party personal injury case, a plaintiff may bring suit in his home

district if he can obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant in
that district.

Subsection (b) covers cases in which jurisdiction is not based
solely on diversity of citizenship, including federal question cases.
Venue in such cases is much more limited than in diversity cases,
because the option of bringing suit in the district where all plaintiffs
reside is not available. Actions for trademark infringement are governed by section 1391(b), at least to the extent that they involve claims
of infringement of a federally registered trademark or violation of
28
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
52 F.R.D. 185, 192 (N.D. Miss. 1971). But see United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic

Workers v. Lee Rubber & Tire Corp., 269 F. Supp. 708, 715 (D.N.J. 1967), aef'd, 394 F.2d 362
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 835 (1968).
27

28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)-(c) (1976).

Although a definitive decision cannot be found, it would seem that a plaintiff who owns a
federal registration could voluntarily limit his claim to common law trademark infringement
and unfair competition and, assuming diversity to be present, lay venue in his own residence
under section 1391 (a). An instructive analogy may be drawn to removal cases. In that context, it
has been held that a plaintiff may, in his complaint, determine whether his claim is based upon
federal law or limited to state law; in the latter situation, the plaintiff may defeat removal under
28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976). See Vitarroz Corp. v. Borden, Inc., 644 F.2d 960, 963-965 (2d Cir.
1981). Assuming that a trademark owner has a registration, the reasons for litigating close to
home would have to be particularly strong to induce the plaintiff to forego asserting its registration. It would have to give up numerous benefits of registration, including constructive notice,
15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1976), and the prima facie evidence of its exclusive right to use the mark. Id. §
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Subsection (c) is a definitional section for purposes of determining where a corporate defendant resides within the meaning of subsections (a) and (b). It is well established that subsection (c) is not a
separate venue provision which renders subsections (a) and (b) inapplicable, and the seeming limitations of subsection (c) are not read
into the other subsections of section 1391.9
Prior to 1966, subsections (a) and (b) did not include the language "or in which the claim arose." This language was added to close
certain "venue gaps" which previously existed. 30 As the United States
Supreme Court described the amendment:
There have been, and perhaps there still are, occasional gaps in the
venue laws, i.e., cases in which the federal courts have jurisdiction
but there is no district in which venue is proper. One such gap
arose in connection with cases involving multiple plaintiffs and
defendants. Venue was fixed at the residence of the defendant, or
in diversity cases at the residence of the plaintiff as well. When
there were multiple plaintiffs or defendants, the district of residence for venue purposes was the district where all plaintiffs or all
defendants reside ....
If they resided in different districts then
there was no proper venue. In 1966 Congress acted to close the gap
with a provision authorizing suit where "the claim arose,"...
which in most cases provides a proper venue even in multiple-party
situations. The development supports the view that Congress does
not in general intend to create venue gaps, which take away with
one hand what Congress has given by way of jurisdictional grant
with the other. Thus, in construing venue statutes it is reasonable
31
to prefer the construction that avoids leaving such a gap.
Because trademark infringement actions are governed by section
1391(b), venue is only proper in a district in which all defendants
reside or in which the claim arose. This article will examine how the
"claim arose" provision has been construed and misconstrued in trade-

1115 (a). Large companies with world-famous marks might well be able to prove infringement
without these benefits, but such plaintiffs could well afford the added expense of litigating at the
defendant's residence. Where a plaintiff has no registration and his only possible federal claim is
under section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act, the scales might well tip in the direction of asserting
state law claims only and laying venue at the plaintiff's residence.
Campbell v. Triangle Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1972); A.P. Green Refractories
Co. v. Peerless Boiler & Eng. Co., 303 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Mo. 1969).
30 See 1 J. MooRE, W. TACOArr & J. WICKER, MooRE's FEERAL PRACrICE 0.142 (5-2) (2d ed.
1976).
31 Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., 406 U.S. 706, 710 n.8 (1972) (emphasis in
original). The Brunette decision concerned the applicability of section 1391(d), a provision that
the Court held subjects aliens to suit, regardless of the cause of action, in any district. 406 U.S. at
714.
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mark cases. The cause of the problem addressed by this article is not,
however, ambiguity in the venue statute. It is probably no worse than
most. The root of the problem, of course, is forum shopping. In
trademark cases, as in many other cases, plaintiffs simply do not wish
to bring suit where the defendant resides if that happens to be a
distant court. They invariably prefer to bring suit where they or their
counsel reside. If that happens to be the district where the defendant
resides, all is well and good. Otherwise, plaintiffs not only have to
shop for a forum, which is virtually always their "home court," but
they must also search for a colorable venue argument. Since trademark infringers seldom limit their activities to a single state, infringing goods often find their way into many different judicial districts. In
one instance, a California company utilizing the same trademark as a
New York concern shipped three karate and judo uniforms to New
York. The confusion caused by the infringement was nothing compared with the ultimate chaos in the state of the law of venue for the
next five years.
THE HONDA CASE

In Honda Associates, Inc. v. Nozawa Trading, Inc. ,32 the New
York plaintiff, owner of a registration for the trademark TOKAIDO
for karate and judo uniforms, brought suit in the District Court for
the Southern District of New York against a California company using
the same trademark on similar goods. Although the vast bulk of the
allegedly infringing activities occurred in California, during a five
year period twenty catalogs featuring the accused trademark entered
the State of New York3 3 in response to mail requests which were
primarily generated through advertisements in a national magazine. 34 Eventually, this resulted in three mail orders, having a total
retail value of thirty-seven dollars, for allegedly infringing articles.
These sales represented 1/100 of 1% of the defendant's martial art
sales and 1/300 of 1% of its total sales. The defendant, which had no
other presence in New York, moved to dismiss the complaint for lack
35
of personal jurisdiction and improper venue.
Judge Conner, a former practicing patent and trademark attorney, first considered the question of personal jurisdiction. The court
3

374 F. Supp. 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).

3 The State of New York has four federal judicial districts. 28 U.S.C. § 112 (1976). The

Honda decision fails to distinguish between activities within the state and activities within the
district.
374 F. Supp. at 888.
3 id.
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relied upon Vanity FairMills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co. 38 for the proposition that in trademark infringement cases the wrong takes place not
where the deceptive labels are affixed to the goods or where the goods
are wrapped in the misleading packages, but where the passing off
occurs. 37 Judge Conner then held that the defendant's mail-order
operations in New York fell within the plain and precise meaning of
that portion of the New York long-arm statute 38 which grants jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who commits a tortious act within the
state. 39 Because that statute required no specified level of activity,
but merely that some damage be sustained by the plaintiff as a result
of the defendant's tortious act, Judge Conner found personal jurisdic40
tion over the defendant.
Examining next the proper venue, the judge first concluded that
the defendant was not incorporated or licensed to do business or
42
actually doing business 41 in New York under section 1391(c).
He then turned to the plaintiff's argument that the claim arose within
the Southern District of New York because the defendant, through
magazine advertisements and catalogs, had offered infringing goods
for sale and had received and filled mail-orders from customers within
the district. Judge Conner set out the question for decision as
-whether the words 'the claim' in subsection (b) means the largestpart
of the claim, a substantial part thereof, or any part thereof." 43 He
observed that if the plaintiff's argument were correct, a trademark
infringer could be sued in any district into which it had shipped goods
or sales literature bearing the infringing mark to a customer or prospective customer.14 After reviewing the authorities at hand, he concluded that if the 1966 amendment had been intended to drastically
expand venue as the plaintiff suggested, it appeared unlikely that

34234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956).
37 Id. at 639.

38N.Y.Civ.

Pitnc. LAW § 302(a)(2) (McKinney 1972).

39 374 F. Supp. at 889.
40

Id.

41 The most frequently cited test for "doing business" under the general venue statute was set

forth in Remington Rand, Inc. v. Knapp Monarch Co., 139 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1956):
[A] corporation will be held to be 'doing business' for purposes of § 1391(c) if its
activities within the district are such that its business has become localized and is an
operation within the district so that some state would probably require the foreign
corporation to be licensed as a condition precedent to doing that business.
Id. at 620-21 (footnotes omitted); see also Papercraft Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 439 F.
Supp. 1060, 1063 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
42 374 F. Supp. at 890.
,3 Id. (emphasis in original).
4 Id. at 891.
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Congress would have done so without comment, or that courts would

45
have been silent about it during the previous seven years.
In the absence of any meaningful precedent in trademark cases,
Judge CQnner turned to antitrust cases, most particularly Philadelphia

Housing Authority v. American Radiator& Sanitary Corp.46 In that

case, which involved an alleged conspiracy to fix prices, the plaintiff
urged that based on section 1391(b) the action could be maintained in
any district in which the defendant had sold plumbing fixtures to the
47
plaintiff at a price which had been raised by the alleged conspiracy.
To determine venue, the Philadelphia Housing Authority court employed a "weight of the contacts" test 48 and ruled that for purposes of
section 1391(b) the claim arose in the district where the defendant's
contacts had been most significant, not in all the districts in which
sales had occurred. 4

In light of this precedent, Judge Conner found

that the weight of contacts was overwhelmingly in California so he
transferred the Honda case to the Central District of California.50 He
carefully circumscribed this decision by stating that in trademark
cases the "weight of contacts" rule should not be applied "so literally
as to exclude suit in any district other than the one where the greatest
volume of infringing activity occurred." 5 ' He further warned that he
was holding "only that the claim should not be deemed to have arisen
in a district in which the defendant has had only miniscule contact,
and that entirely by mail." 5 2 The opinion carefully stated that the
section 1391(b) right to sue "in any district 'in which the claim arose'
was not the right to sue where any part of the claim, however small,
arose." 5 3 He did not need to decide, and did not decide, which of the

43 Id.
48

291 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Pa. 1968).

47 Id. at 259.

The court stated:
It is submitted that 'where the claim arose' should be dependent upon where the
contacts weigh most heavily. A 'weight of the contacts' test would enable venue to
exist in a district where the injury occurred, if significant sales causing substantial
injury were made to plaintiffs there by defendants. If some other overt act pursuant
to the conspiratorial meetings took place in a district and it was a significant and
substantial element of the offense, then venue would lie in that district, as set forth
above in the hypothetical, venue would not lie there. Similarly, if a meaningless and
insignificant meeting of the conspirators took place in a certain district, venue would
not exist there either.
Id. at 260-61.
48 Id. at 262.
s 374 F. Supp at 892.
48

I1
Id.
2

Id.

s Id.
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other two possible meanings was correct: the largest part of the claim
54
or a substantial part of the claim.
Ironically, on the very same day that Honda was decided, Judge
Walter Stapleton of the District of Delaware decided Scott Paper Co.
v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc. ,-5 and reached a very different conclusion
in a much more difficult case. Although the defendant, a Colorado
corporation, in Scott Paperhad no particular presence in Delaware, it
had marketed and advertised the allegedly infringing product "Scott's
Liquid Gold" both nationally and in that state. The plaintiff was a
Pennsylvania corporation.5" Judge Stapleton determined that for
purposes of section 1391(b) the claim arose in the District of Delaware.57 Turning aside the defendant's argument that the allegedly
infringing sales were by defendant's customers and not by defendant
58
itself, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismisss.
Scott Paperwas a more difficult case than Honda. In Honda, the
vast bulk of the infringing sales took place in California and a truly
miniscule portion took place in New York. By contrast, in Scott Paper,
there was apparently an exceptionally large volume of allegedly infringing business done on a national level, spread uniformly around
the country. Since Delaware is a small state, one would expect its
share of infringing sales to be commensurately small. However, Judge
Stapleton commented that the possibility of infringement having occurred elsewhere did not change the fact that injury took place in
Delaware. This suggests that perhaps he would have decided Honda
59
the other way.
As will be shown, the Scott Paper decision attracted relatively
little following, and Honda became the starting point for practically
all trademark cases involving questions of venue. Unfortunately, the

54 Id. Judge Conner also noted that he was not depriving plaintiff of any substantive rights,
but was merely forcing the plaintiff into another district where a much greater volume of the
allegedly infringing business had been conducted. Id.
35 374 F. Supp. 184 (D. Del. 1974).
-" Id. at 185-86. It may seem odd that Scott Paper chose to sue in Delaware. However, Scott
Paper's headquarters is located at the Philadelphia International Airport, from which it is
roughly as easy to reach Wilmington, Delaware as it is to reach the Federal Courthouse in center
city Philadelphia.
57 Id. at 189-90. Judge Stapleton's reasoning was as follows: "Injury to the owner of a mark
occurs when its name is confused with that of the alleged infringer. Such confusion, if it exists in
this case, clearly occurred in the state of Delaware. That it may have occurred elsewhere does
not change this fact." Id. at 190.
a id.
0 It may well be that the defendant in Scott Paper was "doing business" in Delaware under
section 1391(c). The court expressly declined to consider this question, since it found venue
proper under the "claim arose" provision. Id. at 189-190.
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Honda decision was misinterpreted by other judges early on and any
resemblance between the "rules" now being applied and Judge Conner's actual holding in Honda has become truly coincidental.
FROM HONDA TO HINDU AND BEYOND

Tefal, S.A. v. Products InternationalCo.6 0 was the first trade-

mark infringement case involving the "claim arose" issue decided after
Honda and Scott Paper, and is the only case in which the issue was

passed upon by an appellate court. Perhaps for this reason it has been
cited frequently. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit misread Honda and, in doing so, spawned years of mischief in
other courts.

The plaintiffs in Tefal, a French corporation and a New Jersey
corporation, brought suit in the District of New Jersey against a

partnership consisting of two California corporations and its general
manager. As found by the district court, the allegedly infringing
products had been promoted in five areas, including Michigan, California, Colorado, and New York-New Jersey. 6 The New Jersey sales

amounted to approximately five percent of the defendants' national
sales.62 Additionally, the defendants conducted live in-store demonstrations of their products within the District of New Jersey.6 3 The
district court cited the Honda case as adopting the "weight of con-

tacts" theory, which was said to provide that the claim must be
deemed to have arisen in a district where the defendant's contacts are
most significant or at least substantial. It took note of Judge Conner's

limiting language that the weight of contacts rule should not be
applied so strictly as to exclude suit in all but the district of greatest
infringing sales and ruled that the defendant's activities in New Jersey
were substantial enough to "confer venue"6 4 on the court even under
the Honda ruling.6 5 However, the court recognized that there was
0 529 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1976).
61 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 545, 546 (D.N.J. 1975), af'd, 529 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1976). It is
difficult to tell from the opinions whether "New York-New Jersey" was considered one or two of
the given geographical areas.
61 It is unclear from the district court's opinion whether the five percent figure represents the
defendants' New Jersey sales of allegedly infringing goods or all goods. The court of appeals
opinion treated the figures as applying to allegedly infringing goods. 529 F.2d at 496.
63 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 546, af'd, 529 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1976).
4 As a matter of semantics, the use of terms such as "confer venue" and "lack of venue"
which appear in Tefal and other opinions is somewhat improper and illustrates the difficulty
which some courts have in distinguishing between venue and jurisdiction. While those terms are
appropriate for jurisdiction, they really are not as to venue. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)
(lack of jurisdiction over subject matters) and FED. R. Cxv. P. 12(b)(2) (lack of jurisdiction over
the person) with FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) (improper venue),
63 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 547, af'd, 529 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1976).
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substantial difference of opinion as to whether five percent of national
sales was sufficient to support venue under the weight of contacts test
and even as to whether that test itself was appropriate. It thus certified the question for an interlocutory appeal.16
On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit acknowledged defendants' argument that a far greater percentage of their
business in the relevant articles took place in California than in New
Jersey, but found no evidence in the record of the actual value of the
sales in each state. 7 Noting that the defendants' agents gave live sales
demonstrations in New Jersey, the court inferred that the defendants
sold substantial amounts of the allegedly infringing product in the
state and concluded that venue was proper.88 The court then stated:
"If we assume the applicability and soundness of the 'more than
miniscule' test of Honda. . . , a fortiori, that test has been more than
satisfied on this record."'6 9 However, as discussed above, 70 Honda did

not establish that "more than miniscule" was sufficient for venue; it
only held, in essence, that miniscule or less was insufficient. The
Court of Appeals, referring to Scott Paper, declined to pass upon the
plaintiff's alternative contention that any passing off in a district
establishes venue. 7' This, too, was a somewhat unfortunate characterization because Scott Paper apparently involved quite substantial
sales in Delaware.
The next case of interest 72 is Transamerica Corp. v. Transfer
Planning, Inc. ,'73 in which the defendant, a consulting firm which had
yet to obtain a paying client, was located in New Jersey. It sent out
approximately 5,000 brochures containing an allegedly infringing
trademark, of which 100 to 200 were directed to New York State. It
also placed an ad in newspapers which were sold in New York City.
Plaintiff brought suit in the Southern District of New York. 74 As in
Honda, the court found that personal jurisdiction over the defendant
existed." 5 Turning then to venue, the court stated that the 1966

67

529 F.2d at 496.

"

Id. at 496-97.
Id. at 497.

"

70 See supra text accompanying notes 50-54.

71 529 F.2d at 497.

72 Idaho Potato Comm'n v. Washington Potato Comm'n, 410 F. Supp. 171 (D. Idaho 1975),
was decided between the two Tefal decisions. Unlike the other cases discussed herein, this
confusing opinion is merely a decision on a motion to transfer an infringement action from Idaho
to Washington. The court, however, cited Honda in connection with the balancing of contacts,
but concluded that it offered "very little guidance." Id. at 176.
73 419 F. Supp. 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
74 Id. at 1262.
73 Id.
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amendment to section 1391(b) "should not be interpreted to find
venue in any of the multiplicity of districts in which some part of an
alleged wrong, however small, took place." ' 76 Such an interpretation

could establish venue in
in trademark litigation, the court noted,
77
practically every district in the country.
In Transamerica, Judge Lasker found the decision in Honda
persuasive because under that approach section 1391(b) permits, at
most, the right to sue only in a district where a substantial part of the
claim arose.78 Concluding that the defendant's contact with New
York had been miniscule, he held venue to be improper and transferred the case to the District of New Jersey. 79 Since none of the defendant's employees had ever entered the state for business purposes and
the defendant had not earned a penny from its New York solicitations,
the case was readily distinguishable from Scott Paper and Tejal.80
The plaintiff argued, however, that because the defendant had no
sales at all, two to five percent of its mailings should suffice under the
Tefal test. Unmoved by this argument, Judge Lasker countered that in
Tejal the court inferred that five percent of sales accounted for substantial dollar amounts. He also regarded as questionable the plaintiff's assumption that the measure of contact should be based upon
relative portions rather than absolute amounts. 8'
In Sugar Beet Products Co. v. Supply Co., 82 suit was again
brought in the Southern District of New York. The defendants were a
Massachusetts company and a New York company. The case was thus
one in which a potential venue gap might have existed but for the
"claim arose" provision.8 3
78

The New York defendant had about

Id. at 1263.

Id. The court found the rationale of Scott Paper and other cases "questionable." Id.
Id.
7 Id. at 1263-64. Another case decided in the Southern District of New York was a virtual rerun of Honda. In Metropa Co. v. Choi, 458 F. Supp. 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), the defendant had
its only premises in California. It did no advertising or solicitation in New York, and it had only
sold two allegedly infringing wigs to a dealer in New York at a price of $28.99. Judge Weinfeld
held that venue was not proper "in any of the several districts where part of the claim arises." Id.
at 1055. He refused, however, to adopt a rule that the claim arises only where the contacts have
been more substantial than in any other district. Because the contract was miniscule, he held
venue to be improper. Id.
80 419 F. Supp. at 1263.
"
78

81 Id.
32

198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).

8 Id. at 567. Indeed, Judge Tenney noted that the action could not be brought against the

New York company in Massachusetts. Id. In discusssing the problems encountered by applying
the "claim arose" provision in a trademark infringement action in which an item has been
offered for sale in many judicial districts, the court stated that requiring a party to defend itself
in every district in which the item was sold, regardless of the volume or significance of the sale,
would run counter to the basic purpose of the venue statute. Id.
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$100,000 in total sales of the allegedly infringing item during the last
fiscal year, while the Massachusetts defendant did business in New
York through distributors, one of which was the New York defendant.
Judge Tenney found this to be much more than the miniscule contact
84
between the trademark infringement claim and the forum in Honda.
Additionally, the court observed that the New York sales might prove
to be a substantial part or even the largest part of the claim once the
full figures were known.8 5
The Sugar Beet decision certainly cannot be faulted since the
facts suggested at least the possibility that the largest portion of the
claim on a quantitative basis arose in New York.8 6 Moreover, it
stands for the important proposition, which no other court seems to
have grasped either previously or subsequently, that in trademark
cases where there would otherwise be a venue gap, the court should
resolve doubts in favor of the plaintiff so as to effectuate the purpose
87
of the 1966 amendment.
Id.

" Id..

at 567-68. Judge Tenney specially noted the presence of the New York defendant
because the 1966 amendment sought to avoid the problem which would occur if corporations
which resided in different states could only be sued where they resided. He ruled that the
disparate residences of the defendants, a factor which was not present in Honda or Tefal, gave
additional support to the finding that venue was proper in the Southern District. Otherwise,
there would be the type of venue gap which the 1966 amendment sought to fill. Id. at 568.
Id. at 567-68.

See infra notes 203-07 and accompanying text. Shortly after the Sugar Beet decision, Judge
Tenney decided two additional cases involving the "claim arose" provision, Factors Etc., Inc. v.
Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (FactorsI),
and Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro
Arts, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 908 (1979) (FactorsII). These cases did not allege trademark infringement, but were
brought under the common law right of publicity of Elvis Presley which had purportedly been
assigned to the plaintiffs. The defendants in each case were sued for selling merchandise bearing
Presley's image. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. Because the plaintiffs were
apparently residents of Delaware and Tennessee, venue in the Southern District of New York on
the basis of the plaintiff's residence under § 1391(a) was not available. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro
Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d at 218.
In Factors I, the defendant, an Illinois corporation, sold approximately $7000 worth of
Elvis Presley posters in New York during an eight month period. It was not shown that any other
market for defendant's Elvis Presley posters was more substantial than New York. The court
found that there was clearly "more than miniscule contact" with the district and stated that it
could not find these sales to be miniscule "in the absence of evidence demonstrating much greater
sales of that merchandise in other districts." 444 F. Supp. at 287. Even if it were considered
miniscule, the court indicated that there were other personal contacts with New York that would
sustain venue. Id.
In FactorsII, the defendant was an Ohio corporation which claimed to have sold or shipped
less than one percent of its Presley posters to New York. Noting that this figure did not address
the size of the New York market compared to other districts, Judge Tenney extrapolated that the
defendant had sold at least $9,000 worth of the items in New York. He stated that this figure
"might satisfy the Honda 'less than miniscule contacts' test," but he was not forced to make that
decision. 444 F. Supp. at 291. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant was also doing business
87
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At this point, the first of eight venue cases decided in the Northern District of Illinois and the first of five reported decisions on this
issue by Judge John P. Crowley must be examined. In Hindu Incense
v. Meadows,88 the defendants, residents of Michigan, came to the
plaintiff's premises in Chicago and purchased $91.99 worth of incense
and displayed an invoice suggesting that they were operating under
the name GENIE, which was plaintiff's trademark. On this basis, the
plaintiff sued for infringement and the defendants moved to dismiss
on jurisdictional and venue grounds.8 9
Judge Crowley, with apparent reluctance, held that plaintiff had
established at least a threshold of personal jurisdiction.90 On the
venue issue, however, he held:
Utilizing the 'weight of contacts' test which has been developed by
Judge Conner, and which has been adopted by the Third Circuit as
the 'more than miniscule' standard in Tefal. . . ,we can only find
a mere vestige of venue in the Northern District of Illinois. The
display of the invoice form with the 'Genie' logo in Chicago may
constitute some part of the claim of trademark infringement, but it
surely cannot be regarded as either a substantial part or the largest
part of such claim; it is at most a scintilla of substance,
which is
9
more than nothing, but does not amount to anything. '
Judge Crowley accordingly dispatched the case to the Eastern District
92
of Michigan.
While the decision in Hindu is unassailable, it nonetheless carried
the mischaracterization of the Honda decision one step further. Contrary to Judge Crowley's interpretation, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in Tefal did not adopt any rule from the Honda case; it
merely stated that assuming the test to be applicable it had been
satisfied. 93 Moreover, as previously noted, Judge Conner in Honda
did not actually set forth a "weight of contacts" test or a "more than
miniscule" standard. He only held that miniscule or less was not
94
enough.
under section 1391(c), and the defendant failed to controvert the allegation. On this basis venue

was sustained. Id.

" 439 F. Supp 844

89
90

(N.D. Il. 1977).

Id. at 846.
Id.

Id. at 847.
I1
92 Id.

11 See supra text accompanying notes 68 & 69.
94 See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. In a case decided soon after Hindu, Judge
Crowley found contacts which were more than miniscule. A.I.T. Indus., Inc. v. Inland Diamond Prods. Co., 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 784 (N.D. Mll. 1978), involved an alleged trademark
infringement.in addition to a breach of contract and various other claims. Among the several
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The confusion was extended in McDonald's Corp. v. Congdon
Die Casting Co.,9 5 a case in which the principal defendant, a Michigan corporation, shipped electric cookware into the Northern District
of Illinois under the trademarks MAC DONALD'S and MIGHTY
MAC. 6 Although questioned by the court, the defendant's president
averred that less than two percent of the allegedly infringing product
was shipped into the Northern District of Illinois and that less than
three percent of those goods were marketed in that district. It was also
established that the defendant maintained an independent sales representative, participated in houseware shows, and advertised and solicited business in the districtY
Ruling on the defendant's motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue, Judge Leighton stated that the Honda case did not
stand for the proposition that venue can be sustained only where the
defendant has engaged in a substantial amount of activity. 8 As
support for this contention, he noted that the Third Circuit had
interpreted the Honda standard as the "more than miniscule" test.
Finding that the defendant's contacts were at least more than miniscule and might even be considered substantial, Judge Leighton denied
the motion.99 It should be recalled that Judge Conner posed the
venue question as whether the words "the claim" meant the largest
part of the claim, a substantial part of the claim, or any part of the
claim. 00 Judge Leighton in McDonald's suggested a fourth possible
interpretation-more than miniscule, but less than substantial.
Three days after the McDonald's decision, True Form Foundations, Inc. v. Strouse Adler Co.' 0 ' was decided in the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania. In True Form, the defendant's state of incorporation
and principal place of business was Connecticut; however, its alleg-

contacts with the Northern District of Illinois was the shipment of a significant portion of the

defendant's output into Illinois. Without discussing any distinction between jurisdiction and
venue, both of which were at issue, Judge Crowley held that the contacts were more than
miniscule and constituted "a sufficient basis for the maintenance of jurisdiction in this forum
which was initially selected by the plaintiff." Id. at 784.
95 454 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. IMl.1978).
11 Id. at 147.
97 Id. at 146-47. Although not clear from the opinion, this was technically a "venue gap"
case, since a second defendant was a retail store incorporated in Delaware and, apparently,
located in Chicago. See id. at 146. As to "venue gap" cases in which one defendant is a retailer,
see infra text surrounding notes 206 & 207.
98 454 F. Supp. at 148. Judge Leighton stated that "Judge Conner pointedly eschewed taking
such a position." Id.
0Id.
'0
See supra text accompanying note 43.
'0'203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1081 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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edly infringing products had been offered and sold to every major
department store and many smaller stores in the judicial district. This
amounted to nearly a million dollars worth of sales over a five year
period, but only two or three percent of its national sales. In addition
to employing salesmen and fashion consultants who were active in the
district, the defendant had a cooperative advertising program with
0 2
several accounts in the district.1
After discussing PhiladelphiaHousing Authority, Honda, Transamerica and Tefal, and acknowledging that this was a close question,
the court held that the defendant's contacts with the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania were more than miniscule and that the claim could
reasonably be found to have arisen there. 10 3 The court noted in a
footnote that the facts of this case most closely paralleled the situation
in Scott Paper,10 4 but it stated that the rule sustaining venue wherever
5
the wrong or injury occurs seemed "questionable." 10
It may be that cases like Scott Paper and True Form actually
reached the right result but for the wrong reason. It would appear
that at least in the True Form case, the defendant's level of activity in
the forum district had reached the point where it was actually "doing
business" in the district within the meaning of section 1391(c). 10 8
Since neither Scott Papernor True Form involved a secondary defendant which might have caused a venue gap, venue seemingly would
have been proper under the "all defendants reside" provision of subsection (b) as amplified by subsection (c).
The Scott Paperdecision finally found some support in the Western District of Michigan. In the case of Battle Creek Equipment
Co. v. Roberts Manufacturing Co.,107 a Michigan corporation sued,
among others, a Maryland corporation that had its offices in Baltimore and a plant in Pennsylvania where it manufactured the allegedly infringing items.10 Although figures were not submittted as to
the extent of the defendant's sales activity in western Michigan, the
court found no indication that a vast majority of its sales were made
elsewhere. 0 9 Upon reviewing the authorities, the court stated that
the Scott Paper approach was preferable and held that venue was
102
103
104

Id. at 1082.
Id.
Id. at 1082 n.3.

105 Id. at 1082 n.2.

See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
,01 460 F. Supp. 18 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
10$Id. at 19.
109 Id. at 21. The court was also impressed by the defendant's unsolicited catalog mailings into
the district and by the fact that the defendant had a telephone directory listing in the district. Id.
'0
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proper. 10 However, the court also stated that venue could be sustained even under the "weight of the contacts" test because the defendant's activities in the forum district were far greater than those in
Honda."'
As in the True Form case, the Battle Creek court held that the
principal defendant's contacts were more than miniscule and, thus,
sufficient to sustain venue.112 A close reading of the Battle Creek case
suggests that the court was really finding that the corporate defendant
was at least "doing business" in the district. However, the presence in
the case of an additional individual defendant who was apparently
not a Michigan resident would allow proper venue only in the district
where the claim arose. It thus seems that this court simply set forth a
"doing business" argument under the banner of "where the claim
3
arose" to reach what it considered a proper result."
In Hershey Foods Corp. v. Harry London's Candies, Inc. ,114 the
court first found that the defendant was doing business in the district,
and then adopted the Scott Paper approach in considering whether
the claim arose in the district. The court saw no unfairnesss with
venue being proper in every district in the nation when an alleged
infringer has sufficient contacts to support personal jurisdiction." 5
10 Id. The court was moved by Professor Moore's argument that the availability of compulsory process and venue should be coextensive.
This equation of the availability of compulsory process on a non-resident and proper
venue under § 1391(a) would have three advantages. First, it would minimize the
number of instances in which a plaintiff is put to the election of foregoing protections
afforded him by a state with sufficient connection with the subject matter to justify it
in exercising compulsory jurisdiction over the defendant, or shifting the choice of a
state or federal forum to the defendant. Second, in cases in which the defendant is
sued in an inconvenient forum it would broaden the choices available under
§ 1404(a) as interpreted in Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960). Third, it would
shift the issue in motions for transfer from the largely technical questions of which
fact of perhaps many that underlie a claim marks the place at which the claim arose
toward the considerations of convenience that underlie the venue concept.
1 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicsm, MooRE's FmMaAL PRAMcrCE 0.142 (5-2) (2d ed. 1976).
"1 460 F. Supp. at 21.
'is Id.
"'
Lubrizol Corp. v. Neville Chem. Co., 463 F. Supp. 33 (N.D. Ohio 1978), was decided the
day after Battle Creek. This was not, however, an action for infringement, but was a proceeding
by a dissatisfied applicant for registration to review a decision by the Patent and Trademark
Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in an opposition proceeding. See generally 15 U.S.C.
§ 1071(b) (1976). The court in Lubrizol held that the claim did not arise in Ohio, the district of
plaintiff's residence. 463 F. Supp. at 37.
314203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1078 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
I's Id. at 1080. The excessive concern for plaintiffs demonstrated in several of the foregoing
cases perhaps reached its pinnacle in the unreported decision of Governor & Co. of Adventurers
of England Trading Into Hudson's Bay v. Herter's, Inc., No. 77 Civ. 3989 (GLG) (S.D.N.Y.
July 5, 1978). In that case the plaintiffs were the historic Hudson's Bay Company, which was
founded in 1670 and is presently based in Toronto, and a wholly-owned subsidiary which was
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The principal contacts that the Georgia defendant in Holiday

Rambler Corp. v. Arlington Park Dodge" 6 had with the Northern
District of Illinois consisted of the sale in that district, during a seven
year period, of eleven allegedly infringing vans worth over $200,000.
Additionally, one of its salesmen had visited the other defendant, a
local dealer, on four occasions."

7

Ruling on a venue motion, the

court first noted that there was a conflict as to whether the contacts
with the forum had to be "substantial" or merely "more than miniscule.'"" 8 Although the Georgia defendant's sales in Illinois amounted

to less than 22/100 of 1% of its national sales, the court could not
describe over $200,000 as miniscule. Considering all of the circumstances, in addition to the percentage of sales made in the district, the
court found that the defendant did a substantial quantity of business

in the Northern District of Illinois." 9 Based on what sounded like a
"doing business" argument, the court sustained venue under the section 1391(b) "claim arose" provision.120
In Technical Publishing Co. v. Mayne,' 2 1 other out-of-state par-

ties were sued in the Northern District of Illinois. The defendants
based in New York City. Suit was brought in the Southern District of New York. The sole
defendant was a Minnesota corporation with its principal place of business in South Dakota. It
had no office or employees in New York, but it had distributed about 26,000 catalogs in the state
during 1977. Although South Dakota and Minnesota accounted for over one-third of the defendants total sales, only about one percent of these sales were made to residents of the district in
which suit was filed. Moreover, the infringing goods represented less than ten percent of that
amount.
Judge Goettel held that the claim arose in the Southern District of New York. He refused to
be swayed by the vastly larger proportion of sales in Minnesota and South Dakota because
placing venue there would restrict the place where the claim arose to districts in which the
defendant was doing business. Notwithstanding his comments to the contrary, Judge Coettel
followed the Scott Paper approach, effectively allowing the plaintiffs convenience and the
defendant's amenability to process to determine where the claim arose. Arguably, he went
beyond Scott Paper. There, the defendants sales were spread uniformly so that the infringement
had no center of gravity; in Hudson'sBay, the center of gravity was clearly elsewhere. Furthermore, Judge Goettel's concern about restricting where the claim arose to places in which the
defendant is doing business seems unwarranted when there is only one defendant and no venue
gap. In a case of purely local infringement, the claim will only arise where the defendant is doing
business.
In Beecham, Inc., v. Certified Chem. Inc., 472 F. Supp. 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), Judge Duffy
of the Southern District of New York first found that the court had personal jurisdiction over the
defendant by virtue of New York sales. He then simply held that the defendant was not only
doing business in New York, but that the claim of infringement arose in New York by virtue of
those very sales, making venue proper. No prior cases were cited. Id. at 349.
1979).
1a 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 750 (N.D. Ill.
117 Id. at 751.
118Id.
119Id. The court stated that "defendant's contacts with this district stands on significantly
firmer grounds than the miniscule contacts in Honda and Hindu." Id.
,20The court's reasoning also contained overtones of the due process argument in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 311 (1945).
1s1206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 284 (N.D. IMl.1979).
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were a corporation and an individual located in Indiana whose business in Illinois was all conducted by mail. This business accounted for
about $2700, or 8% of their total sales.122

Concluding that these

figures "dwarf" the volume of sales in Honda and Hindu, the court
found the defendant's activities in Illinois to be substantial.123 However, the court determined that the plaintiff had not carried the
burden of proving that the defendant's Illinois sales exceeded the
volume of Indiana sales and noted that a strict application of the
weight of contacts test would require dismissal or transfer. Thus, the
court was squarely faced with the question expressly left open by
Judge Conner in Honda: whether it was necessary to establish that a
substantial part of the claim or the largest part of the claim arose
within the district. Judge Grady in Technical Publishing held that
venue was proper if a substantial portion of the plaintiff's claim arose
in the district, and denied the motion to dismiss or transfer. 24
The last reported trademark decision on the venue issue prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Leroy v. Great Western United
Corp. 2 5 was Judge Crowley's opinion in Griffin v. Gates.1 2

This

dispute, lodged in Illinois' Northern District, was between former
members of a rock group. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
improperly used the mark BREAD. On a two month concert tour, the
defendants made one appearance in Chicago. They also appeared on
a nationally televised program which was seen in the area. 12 7 Although the Chicago concert and the Chicago viewing of the television
show constituted a part of the alleged infringement, Judge Crowley
found that they could not be deemed a substantial part of it.1 8 He
transferred the case to the Central District of California, where he
noted that the charges against the defendants had their "roots."' 12 9
Leroy v. Great Western United Corp. 30
In Leroy, Great Western, a Delaware corporation headquartered
in Dallas, made a public offer to purchase stock in Sunshine Mining
and Metal Company, a Washington corporation which operated a

Id. at 285. Five percent of the sales, about $1700, were in the Northern District of Illinois.
287. The "sales" in Hindu, however, were not sales at all; they were purchases. See
supra text accompanying notes 88 & 89.
"
206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 287.
' See infra notes 130-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of Leroy.
205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1150 (N.D. fI1. 1979).
"
127Id. at 1151.
"2 Id. at 1152.
"1

I" Id. at

129
Id.
1- 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
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mine in Idaho and engaged in business, directly or through a subsidiary, in New York and Maryland.131 Sunshine's stock was traded over
the New York Stock Exchange. Idaho, New York, and Maryland all
had similar "corporate takeover statutes," laws designed to regulate
takeover offerings of corporations having certain connections with the
state. 132 Great Western had consulted with state officials in Idaho,
New York, and Maryland about compliance, and had filed documents
with the appropriate Idaho authorities to attempt to comply with the
Idaho statute. The Idaho authorities objected to certain aspects of the
filing, however, and entered an order delaying the effective date of
the tender offer.

33

Great Western filed suit in the District Court for the Northern
District of Texas against the responsible state officials of Idaho, New
York, and Maryland, seeking a declaration that the three state laws
were invalid insofar as they attempted to regulate interstate cash
tender offers to purchase securities traded on a national stock exchange. 34 The claims against the Maryland and New York defendants were dismissed when those states made it clear that they would
not attempt to block the tender offer. The Idaho defendants appeared
35
and contested venue.1

The district court determined that venue was improper under
section 1391(b) because the defendants did not reside in Texas and
because the claim arose in Idaho rather than Texas. 1 6 However,
venue was sustained under a special venue provision in the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.137 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
131 Id.

at 175-76.

'33

Id.

'3

Id. at 177.

134 Id.

13 Id. at 177-78.
136Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420, 433 (N.D. Tex. 1977), aJJ'd, 577
F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
IV Id. at 434. The court found that venue could be sustained under § 27 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1976).
The district courts of the United States ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in
equity or actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this
chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder. Any criminal proceeding may be
brought in the district wherein any act or transaction constituting the violation
occurred. Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or
rules and regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of such chapter or rules
and regulations, may be brought in any such district or in the district wherein the
defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, and process in such cases
may be served in any other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or
wherever the defendant may be found.
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agreed with the district court that venue was proper under the special
venue statute.1 3 In addition, it also held that venue was proper under
section 1391(b) because the allegedly invalid restraint against Great
Western occurred in the Northern District of Texas and, thus, the
"claim arose" within that district. 39 The court of appeals noted that
a single action against the officials of New York, Maryland, and Idaho
could not have been instituted in any
one place unless the claim were
140
treated as having arisen in Dallas.
The Supreme Court reversed.14 ' It first held that venue was
improper under the special venue statute. 42 Turning next to the
question of whether the claim arose in Dallas within the meaning of
section 1391(b), 4 3 the Court began its analysis by observing that, in
most instances, the purpose of venue laws is to protect the defendant
against the risk that a plaintiff will select an unfair or inconvenient
place of trial. For this reason, Congress had not generally made the
44
residence of the plaintiff a basis for venue in non-diversity cases.
The Court noted that although it might be desirable to consolidate
similar claims in one proceeding, that concern did not "justify reading
the statute to give the plaintiff the right to select the place of trial that
best suits his convenience." 4 s The Court found no reason to read the
venue statute broadly to protect plaintiffs unlesss its plain language
opened "the severe type of 'venue gap'" that the 1966 amendment
was designed to close. 40 Justice Stevens, writing for a six to three
majority, held:

"3 Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1272-73 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd sub
nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
"1 Id. at 1273. The court of appeals cited Professor Moore's argument equating the availability of compulsory process with venue under section 1391. See supra note 110.
110Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1273-74 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd sub
nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
4

443 U.S. at 187.

Id. at 181-82. The Fifth Circuit's special venue argument was premised on the theory that
section 28(a) of the 1934 Securities Act imposed a duty on the states not to enforce a statute that
conflicted with the federal securities provisions. See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d
1256, 1271, 1273-74 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S.
173 (1979). This duty could be redressed in the federal courts under section 27 of the 1934 Act.
Id. The Supreme Court held that section 28(a) imposed no such duty. Thus, section 27 could not
establish venue. 443 U.S. at 181-82.
143 Section 1391(a) did not apply because subject matter jurisdiction, in addition to being
invoked under diversity of citizenship, was also invoked under the federal question provision of
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) and the acts affecting commerce provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976).
"1 443 U.S. at 183-84.
"'

I'sId. at 184.
148 Id.
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The statute allows venue in 'the judicial district ...in which the
claim arose.' Without deciding whether this language adopts the
occasionally fictive assumption that a claim may arise in only one
district, it is absolutely clear that Congress did not intend to provide for venue at the residence of the plaintiff or to give that party
an unfettered choice among a host of different districts....
Rather, it restricted venue either to the residence of the defendants
or to 'a place which may be more convenient to the litigants'-i.e.,
both of them 'or to the witnesses who are to testify in the case. .. .'
In our view, therefore, the broadest interpretation of the language
of § 1391(b) that is even arguably acceptable is that in the unusual
case in which it is not clear that the claim arose in only one specific
district, a plaintiff may choose between those two (or conceivably
even more) districts that with approximately equal plausibility-in
terms of the availability of witnesses, the accessibility of other
not of
relevant evidence, and the convenience of the defendant (but
47
claim.1
the
of
locus
the
as
assigned
be
the plaintiff)-may
The Court found the instant case not to be unusual because it had
one obvious locus, the District of Idaho.148 This was the only district
in which the "claim arose" within the meaning of section 1391(b).149
The Court brushed aside the purported contacts with the Northern
District of Texas, noting that the reasoning supporting venue in that
district would have subjected the Idaho officials to suit in every district in the country. 50 It also would have been inconsistent with the
underlying purpose of the provision, since it would have left the venue
decision entirely in the hands of plaintiffs rather than making it
"'primarily a matter of convenience of litigants and witnesses.' ,
Ayr

LEROY

The Supreme Court's decision in Leroy should have totally resolved the issue of federal venue in multi-state trademark infringement actions. At the very least, it should have had a tremendous effect
on it. In fact, however, subsequent decisions have not even considered
Leroy.
Almost a year after the Leroy decision, Judge Crowley decided
Gold Eagle Co. v. Li. 52 The plaintiff was an Illinois corporation.
147 Id. at 184-54 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
11SId. at 185.
119Id. at 187.
'5

Id. at 186.

"' Id. at 186-87
(1967)).
1-2

(quoting Denver & R.G.W.R. Co. v. Railroad Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556, 560

486 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. IlM.1980).
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The defendant, operating solely out of California, sold its products
throughout the United States. It advertised in nationally circulated
publications, and within the forum district it had participated in a
trade show and had distributed cards listing Chicago as one of its
places of business. 153 Contending that its Illinois contacts were de
minimus because its Illinois sales amount to less than 1.5 % of its total
sales, the defendant moved to transfer the case to California. 4 It
argued that proper venue should be decided by a weight of contacts
test and that, under that test, there was no basis for venue in the
Northern District of Illinois because only an insubstantial part of the
alleged misconduct occurred there. 5
Judge Crowley, with exquisite understatement, observed that the
meaning of the word "claim" in section 1391(b) had not been "precisely defined," but that the claim is not deemed to have arisen in a
district where the defendant has had only miniscule contact. 50 He
stated that venue was proper only in the districts in which an infringer
has had "significant activities."'5 Concluding that the defendant's
contacts with the district were more than miniscule and greater than
the "mere vestige" of venue he found in Hindu, Judge Crowley denied
the motion.15 8 If Honda and its progeny represented the sole authority on the venue issue, the propriety of the Gold Eagle decision would
be simply questionable; however, in light of Leroy, Cold Eagle was
wrongly decided.
A few weeks later, Judge Crowley decided Chicago Reader,
Inc. v. Metro College Publishing, Inc.,159 in which the publisher of a
Chicago newspaper under the trademark READER brought suit
against a Minnesota company which published THE TWIN CITIES
READER, a newspaper distributed almost exclusively in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area.1 60 The defendant contended that venue was
improper in the Northern District of Illinois because its contacts with
the district were insignificant.' 6 ' It distributed only thirty-six copies

15 Id. at 202.
.154 Id.

Id. at 202-03.
I" Id. at 203.
157 Id.
"ss

158 Id.

15 495 F. Supp. 441 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
16 Id. at 442-43.
''1 Id. at 443. The defendant argued chiefly that all of its assets and its only place of business
were in Minnesota and that the newspaper's contents were directed to local readers. Id. The
plaintiff contended that the defendant conducted business regularly within Illinois, billed Illinois
advertisers substantial amounts, and actively solicited additional Illinois advertising. Id.
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of its newspaper there. 6 2 Judge Crowley, in denying a motion to
dismiss or transfer, continued the trend of blurring "doing business"
and jurisdictional contacts with the concept of where a trademark
infringement claim arose. Again he stated that venue is proper only in
6 3
those districts in which the infringer has had "significant activities."
Considering the totality of the defendant's activities in this case,
which he found to include negotiations with Illinois advertisers, attendance at two trade shows in Illinois, and the circulation of the
paper in the state, he concluded that there was more than Hindu's
"mere vestige of venue."'16 4
FinanceCo. of America v. Bank America Corp. 6 s was decided a
full year after Leroy, yet it too did not cite the Leroy decision. As
many courts had done previously,' this court observed that in infringement cases the claim is considered to arise where the passing off
occurs. 167 It stated that passing off could occur in every district when
the allegedly infringing item was used on a nationwide basis. 6 8 Quoting Quinn v. Bowmar Publishing Co., 69 an antitrust case, it held that
in such a case the test is whether" 'significant sales causing substantial
injury were made in the district in which venue is asserted, or some
other overt act constituting a significant and substantial element of
the offense occurred there.' "70 Having thus listed two tests, it found
"this requirement" to be satisfied by the substantial contacts that the
plaintiff had with the forum, as well as the defendant's significant
17
business there. '
In Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Seabrook Brothers & Sons, 72 Judge
Lasker of the Southern District of New York ignored Leroy and
arguably misconstrued both Honda and Tefal. Nevertheless, the result
he reached was probably correct. Affidavits established that less than
one-sixth of the defendant's sales were made in the Southern District
162Id.

163 Id. For this proposition the court cited Transamerica Corp. v. Transfer Planning, Inc., 419
F. Supp. 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See supra text accompanying notes 72-81.
'6
495 F. Supp. at 443. Although this decision superficially seems incorrect in light of Leroy,
other factors may sustain its validity. See incfa text accompanying notes 198-200. Judge Crowley's entire analysis was arguably dictum, since he held in a footnote that the defendant had
sufficient contacts to be deemed a resident of Illinois. 495 F. Supp. at 444 n.5.
'
493 F. Supp. 895 (D. Md. 1980).
,88See, e.g., Transamerica Corp. v. Transfer Planning, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1261, 1262

(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
10"493 F. Supp. at 910.
16 Id.

189445 F. Supp. 780 (D. Md. 1978).
170 493 F. Supp. at 910 (quoting 445 F. Supp. at 783).
171 Id.
I'l495 F. Supp. 792 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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of New York and approximately one-half of its sales were made in
New Jersey, with the remainder throughout the eastern United
States.'"7 Venue was transferred to the District of New Jersey. 174
Judge Lasker cited Honda for the proposition that it had adopted
the "weight of contact" test and then attributed to Judge Conner a
quote to the effect that, in determining where the claim arose, the
weight of the defendant's contacts in the various districts must be
compared and the claim must be deemed to have arisen where the
contacts have been most significant. 1 75 In fact, Judge Conner, at that
point in his opinion, 76 was summarizing the PhiladelphiaHousing
Authority case. 17 7 As noted above, 178 Judge Conner expressly stated
that he was not holding that the weight of contact rule should be
applied so literally as to exclude suit in any district but the one having
the greatest volume of activity. Additionally,the plaintiff in Seabrook
Foods relied upon Tefal, arguing that if five percent of sales was
enough to sustain venue in Tefal, one-sixth of the sales should also be
deemed sufficient. 179 While distinguishing the two cases, Judge
Lasker inaccurately80 characterized Tefal as a claim for infringing sales
in only one state. 1
Finally, in HeritageHouse Frame & Molding Co. v. Boyce Highlands Furniture Co.,

181

a New York corporation brought suit in the

Eastern District of New York against a New Hampshire corporation.
In denying the defendant's motion to dismiss based on improper
venue, the court simply found that the plaintiff presented sufficient
information to conclude that the allegedly infringing goods had been

175

Id. at 793.
Id. at 794.
Id. at 793.

176

Honda, 374 F. Supp. at 891.

173
174

Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 291 F. Supp.
252 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
178 See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
179 493 F. Supp. at 794 n.3.
I" Id. In an unreported opinion on a motion for reargument, Judge Lasker defended this
characterization by pointing to the language in the Third Circuit's opinion in Tefal, 529 F.2d at
496, which referred to the "nature of the claim-the extent of infringing sales in New Jersey."
Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Seabrook Bros. & Sons, 80 Civ. 1405 (MEL) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 1980).
Judge Lasker ignored the fact that Tefal also involved the issue of the propriety of a preliminary
injunction. In fact, the district court opinion includes that court's actual order granting the
preliminary injunction, which had no geographical limitation whatsoever. Tefal, S.A. v. Products Int'l Co., 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 548, affd, 529 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1976). Indeed, it is clear
that a court of equity having personal jurisdiction over a party has the power to enjoin him from
committing acts elsewhere. New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931).
'7

"1 88 F.R.D. 172 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
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sold in the district and that this satisfied the "more than miniscule
82
contacts" test of Honda.

Interestingly, in the recent case of Cojace v. Optique de Monde,
Ltd., 83 involving breach of contract and fraud, Judge Conner had
occasion to cite both Honda and Leroy. The principal defendant in
the case conducted business solely in Illinois.18 4 Judge Conner cited

Honda for the proposition that determining the district in which a
claim arose requires an examination of the weight of defendant's
contacts regarding the claim in the various districts concerned.18 5 He
cited Leroy for the proposition that only in an unusual case would a
claim be deemed to have arisen in more than one district, and then
only when the "approximately equal plausibility" test is met. 8 Concluding that the claim arose only in Illinois, and that it did not also
arise in New York, Judge Conner transferred the case.18 7
A PRoPosED

APPROACH

In light of Leroy, the numerous decisions in trademark infringement cases sustaining venue when the sole contact with the forum is
some relatively small percentage of the infringing sales can no longer
be supported. If a single district accounts, for example, for five percent of the infringing sales, there could theoretically be twenty such
districts in which there would be an equal likelihood of sustaining
venue. This is hardly the "unusual case" suggested by the Supreme
Court in Leroy. On the contrary, it would be a rather commonplace
occurrence.
A fundamental problem which has prevented more serious analysis of this issue has been the continued reliance by courts on the
proposition set forth in the Vanity Fair case' 88 that, in cases of trademark infringement, the wrong takes place where the deceived customer buys the product. 89 In Vanity Fair, the Court of Appeals for

182

Id. at 173. The opinion stated that the defendant regularly sold its products in the district.

id.
I3 521 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
'84Id.

at 502.

185 Id. at 505.
18a Id.
187

Id. at 511.

I" See supra text accompanying notes 36 & 37.
189 234 F.2d at 639. Vanity Fairwas directly relied upon in the context of determining venue
in Tefal, see supra notes 60-71 and accompanying text, Battle Creek, see supra notes 107-13 and
accompanying text, Hershey Foods, see supra note 114 and accompanying text, and Hudson's
Bay see supra note 115. It was also cited in the context of determining personal jurisdiction in
Honda, see supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text, Heritage House, see supra notes 181 & 82
and accompanying text, FactorsI and FactorsII, see supra note 87, Metropa, see supra note 79,
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the Second Circuit was considering the propriety of a claim brought in
a United States court asserting a trademark infringement which occurred in Canada. The court noted that under the doctrine of lex loci

delicti, the creation and extent of tort liability is governed by the law
of the place where the alleged tort was committed, the place of the
wrong being where the last event necessary to make an actor liable
occurs. 0 It was at this point that the court stated that in cases of
trademark infringement and unfair competition the wrong takes place
where the deceived customer buys the product. Thus, the court held
that the claim was governed by Canadian law. 1 9'

There are at least three reasons why courts should not continue to
be wedded to the language in Vanity Fair in dealing with federal
venue in trademark cases. First, and most obviously, the court in
Vanity Fair was only addressing the issue of where a claim matures
for purposes of choice of law. The decision had nothing whatsoever to
do with federal venue, which presupposes that a case is cognizable in
a United States court. Secondly, the doctrine of lex loci delicti is a rule
92
which has been quickly losing ground in the field of conflicts of law. 1
As a general proposition, in many jurisdictions, choice of law in tort

cases is now governed by the law of the state which has the most
significant relationship to the litigation and the parties. 9 3 Because
unfair competition is a tort, courts have determined choice of law
questions by the "most significant relationship" standard. Typically,

the principal location of the defendant's conduct is given greatest
weight. 9

4

Finally, the actual holding in Vanity Fair has been seri-

and Beecham, see supra note 115. In the latter group of cases, in which federal venue was also in
issue, Vanity Fair may have played a role in the court's reasoning on the venue question.
190234 F.2d at 639.

Id.
191The
'11

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 145 (1971) provides:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles
stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine
the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

Id.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the
particular issue.
193Id.; see, e.g.. Pittway Corp. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 641 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1981).
191Systems Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1137 (3d Cir.
1977); Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1071 (N.D. II. 1979),
aJJ'd, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
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ously questioned. Recent authority proposes that the Lanham Act
provides subject matter jurisdiction as to an alien defendant's foreign
act of trademark infringement.9 5
Neither is there reason why courts, in considering where a claim
arose for trademark infringement, should limit their inquiry for contacts of consequence only to the actual sales of the allegedly infringing
merchandise. Instead, it would be well to go back to basics and take a
second look at the original "weight of contacts" test set forth in
PhiladelphiaHousing Authority. 98 There the court held that where
the claim arose should be dependent upon where the contacts weigh
most heavily. In the context of an antitrust case, that court indicated
that venue might exist "if significant sales causing substantial injury"
which was "a
or "some other overt act" took place in the district
19 7
significant and substantial element of the offense.'
It is therefore submitted that in deciding where the claim arose in
a trademark infringement case a court should look not only at where
:the infringing sales occurred, but also at other potentially pertinent
factors, including the place where the deceptive labels are affixed to
the goods and the place where the goods are wrapped in the misleading packages, the very elements said to be irrelevant in Vanity Fair I 8
A court should also give consideration to where the defendant made
its decision to adopt the allegedly infringing name and where, if at all,
the defendant learned of the plaintiff's rights. To be sure, consideration should be given to where the goods were sold, but only if a truly
meaningful portion of those sales, for example, a quarter or a third,
occurred in a given district. The factors cited in Leroy, namely,
availability of-witnesses, accessibility of other evidence, and the convenience of the defendant, should, of course, be added to the equation. The courts should have a reasonable amount of discretion to
weigh the various elements in determining whether suit has been filed
in the single district in which the claim arose, or at least in one of the
small number of districts having "approximately equal plausibility".
In some cases, the place of defendant's infringing sales may take
on greater significance. There may be cases such as Chicago
9 9 in which the vast bulk of the defendant's activities were not
Reader,1
in the forum district. In such a case, it may be that the plaintiff is

1g5

Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 427-29 (9th Cir. 1977).
,95 See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
'97 291 F. Supp. at 260 (emphasis added).
198 234 F.2d at 639.
I" Chicago Reader, Inc. v. Metro College Publishing, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 441 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
See supra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
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seeking an injunction or damages only with respect to the defendant's
sales in the forum district, so that200the small number of sales in the
district takes on greater meaning.

Difficulty may arise in situations similar to that in the Technical
Publishingcase, 20 in which the plaintiff sues not only a foreign corporation possibly doing business in the district, but also a foreign individual who may be a principal and perhaps the alter ego of the
corporation. At least in the latter case, it may be possible for the

plaintiff, in resisting a motion to dismiss, to obtain a holding that the
corporation and the individual are one and the same for venue purposes.2 °2 In other cases, the plaintiff may have to forego joining the

individual if he feels strongly enough about establishing venue in a
given district.
In light of the federal policy towards the 1966 amendment to the
general venue statute,20 3 when a case poses a close question, the

statute should be construed to avoid creating a venue gap. While there
20 4
is no question that the 1966 amendment, as a remedial statute,
should be liberally construed, a canon of interpreting such a statute is

that its application is limited to the evil intended to be suppressed.2 05
This is consistent with the holding in Leroy that the 1966 amendment
should be construed to avoid a venue gap, but not to create a multitude of possible locations for suit. This suggests that somewhat different standards or different burdens of proof should exist in cases where,

2" In fact, this was probably not the case in Chicago Reader, since instances of actual
confusion allegedly took place in Vermont, New York, and California. 495 F. Supp. at 443-44
n.5.
010Technical Publishing Co. v. Mayne, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 284 (N.D. IMl.1979). See supra
notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
"2 Cf. DCA Food Indus., Inc. v. Hawthorn Mellody, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 574, 583-86
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (nominal independence of subsidiary corporation from its parent insufficient to
sustain improper venue argument).
203 Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., 406 U.S. 706 (1972). See supra note 31
and accompanying text.
2' A "remedial" statute is defined as one which neither enlarges nor impairs substantive
rights, McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 224 (1957), but rather one which
relates to the means and procedure for enforcing those rights, such as a venue statute. Bagsarian
v. Parker Metal Co., 282 F. Supp. 766, 769 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
203 This principle was aptly stated by the court in Potter v. United States, 269 F. Supp. 545,
549 (N.D.W. Va. 1967):
An ancient canon of interpretation of remedial statutes is that the old law, the
mischief and the remedy are to be considered and the statute interpreted, if possible,
to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy .... However, the limits of the
application of a statute are generally held to be coextensive with the evil or purpose
it was intended to suppress or effectuate, and neither stop short of, nor go beyond,
the purpose which the legislature had in view.
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but for the "claim arose" provision, there would be a venue gap. In
such cases, the plaintiff should have a lesser burden of establishing
that the district in which he brought suit has at least "approximately
equal plausibility" with any other district. In cases where the defendants all reside in the same district or where there is only one defendant, the plaintiff should have a greater burden of establishing that no
district other than the one in which he brought suit has greater
plausibility than the instant forum.
In considering whether a true "venue gap" exists, a court should
give consideration to the status of the different defendants. In cases
such as McDonald's20 6 and Holiday Rambler,20 7 the plaintiff's real
gripe was undoubtedly with the manufacturer who was located outside the district, while the second defendant, who was located in the
district, was merely a customer or dealer of the manufacturer. The
plaintiff's claim against the customer, though technically proper, is
obviously of secondary significance. A court should not allow the
plaintiff to create a venue gap by the simple expedient of bringing in a
mere seller as a nominal defendant.
Although these suggested rules may force plaintiffs to travel to a
distant forum more often than previously, they are in accord with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of what Congress has legislated. At
least in federal question cases, the Court has expressly decided that
convenience to the plaintiff is not a factor to be considered in determining where the claim arose. It is tempting to suggest that trademark plaintiffs are different because they suffer harm in their home
district, but they certainly are not unique in this respect. All plaintiffs
have assertedly been harmed or aggrieved; that is what makes them
plaintiffs.
Other considerations may tend to mitigate the harshness of these
rules. First, the activities of certain corporate defendants within the
plaintiff's home district may well be sufficient to establish that those
corporations are "doing business" in the district within the meaning of
section 1391(c). In a case such as True Form,20 8 the activities of the

defendant in the district appeared to be so substantial, regular and
systematic that it would not seem unreasonable to hold that the
defendant was doing business in the district. These suggested rules are
also mitigated by the fact that, in many situations, the plaintiff can
bring suit in state court based upon the state's long-arm statute and a

-6 See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
207 See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
m See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
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relatively nominal amount of infringing goods shipped into the state.

Indeed, Honda and later cases stressed the fact that there is no minimum level of activity to establish personal jurisdiction. The federal

venue statute does not apply, of course, in state courts.
CONCLUSION

The federal courts, in dealing with the issue of where the claim
arose in trademark cases, need to fully re-examine their basic premises
and develop new rules which are consistent with overriding federal
law and which can be properly and fairly applied to effectuate the
20 9
purposes of the venue statute.

00 As this article was being prepared for publication, Accutest Corp. v. Accu Test Systems,
Inc., 532 F. Supp. 416 (D. Mass. 1982), became the first reported trademark venue decision to
cite and rely upon Leroy. In Accutest, the defendant, a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in Texas, was not selling infringing goods at all. Rather, it was conducting a
public offering of stock under a corporate name which allegedly had the effect of diverting
capital from the plaintiff, which had a similar corporate name. Id. at 417-18. The United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts variously characterized the defendant's contacts
with the forum district as "miniscule at the most," id. at 422, and as "no contact." Id. at 421.
The defendant's prospectus was allegedly available in Massachusetts; two underwriters of the
defendant's stock and one broker who handled the defendant's stock had offices in Massachusetts;
two Massachusetts offices had computer retrieval systems which provided access to information
on the defendant's stock; and an advertisement regarding the stock offering had appeared in the
New York Times. While the defendant had actually instructed its underwriters not to sell stock to
anyone in Massachusetts, in fact, some of defendant's stock may have been sold there. Id. at 418.
The court first granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Turning to venue, the court noted Leroy made it clear that, while the claim might arguably arise
in more than one district in an unusual case, it could not arise where the relationship between the
claim and the forum was as attenuated as it was in the instant case. None of the relevant factors
identified by Leroy were found to be present. Id. at 421-22.
The court harmonized its decision with prior trademark venue cases such as Honda,
Metropa and Transamerica, which were said to hold that the claim did not arise in a district
with which the defendant had only miniscule contact. Id. at 422. The court distinguished
Hershey Foods and Technical Publishingas involving far more substantial levels of activity than
the present case, and further expressed doubt that the "broader interpretation" of those cases
"would survive Leroy." Id. at n.3. Finding that the defendant was not "doing business" in
Massachusetts, the court found a second reason to dismiss the action: improper venue. Id. at 423.
Because Accutest did not involve the actual sale of infringing goods, it did not call into
question the underlying Vanity Fair rationale or squarely present an opportunity to expressly
reject prior cases which had found venue proper based solely upon a small portion of infringing
sales. The decision is, however, most welcome as a belated recognition that the federal venue
statute should be applied consistently in all types of cases and that trademark cases are no
exception to that rule.

